Volume 21

Issue 2

Article 3

10-7-2019

Are Middle Managers’ Cost Decisions Sticky? Evidence from the
Field
Byunghoon Jin
John C. Cary

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.ebrjournal.net/home
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Jin, B., & Cary, J. C. (2019). Are Middle Managers’ Cost Decisions Sticky? Evidence from the Field.
Economic and Business Review, 21(2). https://doi.org/10.15458/ebr.85

This Original Article is brought to you for free and open access by Economic and Business Review. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Economic and Business Review by an authorized editor of Economic and Business
Review.

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 21 | No. 2 | 2019 | 243-274

243

ARE MIDDLE MANAGERS’ COST DECISIONS
STICKY? EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD
BYUNGHOON JIN1
JOHN C CARY2

Received: February 9, 2018
Accepted: May 21, 2018

Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003) show that costs are “sticky” (i.e.,
costs change relatively less when sales decrease than when sales increase) because managers
are reluctant to cut resources when sales decrease. We predict that cost behavior at the middle
management level is sticky also when the magnitude of sales increase is sufficiently large,
considering that middle managers have more limited ability in adding resources and are
more risk averse. Using a survey instrument and interviews, we find evidence that middle
managers’ cost decisions are sticky at both ends. Our findings are supported by empirical
evidence based on segment-level data.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003, hereafter ABJ) and subsequent studies in
the management accounting literature document that costs decrease relatively less when
sales decrease than they increase when sales increase by an equivalent amount; i.e., costs
are “sticky”. While the literature explains such asymmetric cost behavior as a result of
asymmetric cost decisions by managers, most studies in cost stickiness literature either
examine cost behavior at the corporate level or focus on CEOs as decision makers. In
this study, we focus on middle managers who have significant influence on the corporate
strategy through day-to-day operational decisions and also have characteristics distinct
from those of CEOs or other top managers. Unlike prior studies that rely heavily on
archival data to examine cost stickiness, we take a behavioral approach and more directly
ask middle managers in practice about their cost decisions, using a survey instrument
and interviews in addition to a regression analysis. We find that middle managers’ cost
decisions are sticky not only when sales decrease but also when the magnitude of sales
increase is sufficiently large.

1 Marist College, School of Management, Poughkeepsie, USA, e-mail: byunghoon.jin@marist.edu
2 Corresponding author, Marist College, School of Management, Poughkeepsie, USA, e-mail: john.cary@marist.
edu
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Cost decisions at the middle management level are important and thus worth examining
because of two reasons. First, middle managers are more involved in the day-to-day
operations of a company than top managers and are also likely to be the ultimate decision
makers for the business unit and thus can have significant influence on the firm’s overall
costs (Kanter, 1982). Second, at the same time, middle managers’ cost decisions are likely
to be different from those of top managers because middle managers are likely to (1) have
more limited ability in adding resources due to limited annual budgets and corporate-level
policies or strategies to follow, which are typically set by top managers (Williamson, 1975;
Mueller, 2003), and (2) be more risk averse because of their compensation structure, which
is focused relatively more on fixed salary and less on incentives such as cash bonus and
equity-based compensation.
To examine cost behavior at the middle management level, we conducted both a survey
and field interviews, directly asking middle managers in practice to describe their
decisions related to various types of costs, including overall SG&A costs, under various
situations regarding the change in sales revenue. The analysis results based on the detailed
interviews and 152 survey responses indicate that middle managers’ cost decisions are
sticky when sales decrease (or, to be more accurate, when the magnitude of sales decrease
is sufficiently large), consistent with the findings in the previous empirical studies, and also
when the magnitude of sales increase is sufficiently large. To complement our behavioral
findings, we also conducted an empirical analysis using segment level data. The regression
results based on 26,050 segment/year observations support our prediction and behavioral
findings.
Our study contributes to the accounting and management literature in several ways. First,
using a survey instrument and field interviews, we provide direct evidence that managers’
resource capacity decisions are sticky, which supports the explanations in the previous
studies based on empirical models and archival data (e.g., ABJ). Second, more importantly,
we provide an additional insight that at least at the middle management level costs are
sticky not only when sales decrease but also when a firm experiences a sufficiently large
increase in sales revenue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the prior literature
on cost stickiness and middle managers and provide our research hypothesis. In Section 3,
we describe the design and procedures of the survey instrument and interviews. Section 4
presents our data and summary statistics. In Section 5, the results of the quantitative and
qualitative analyses are presented, followed by the conclusion in Section 6.
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Cost stickiness
The asymmetric cost behavior, called “cost stickiness,” was first documented by ABJ. Using
archival data spanning 20 years (from 1979 to 1998), ABJ showed that costs decrease less
when sales fall than they increase when sales rise by an equivalent amount. ABJ argued
that the fundamental reason for cost stickiness is that changing the levels of committed
resources is costly. Adjustment costs include severance pay when employees are laid off,
recruiting and training costs when new employees are hired, as well as organizational costs
such as loss of morale among the remaining employees when colleagues are terminated.
Because of the adjustment costs, managers will choose to retain unutilized resources
to some extent when sales decline and there is uncertainty about the permanence of a
decline in demand. In contrast, when demand increases beyond the available resource
capacity, managers do not have as much discretion in adding resources because not
doing so would result in losing not only current sales but also future sales because of
disappointed customers. As a result of the asymmetry in resource capacity decisions, costs
become sticky, i.e., costs decrease relatively less when sales fall than they increase when
sales increase by an equivalent amount.
Consistent with this explanation, previous studies have shown that the degree of cost
stickiness is related to macroeconomic factors and firm-specific factors which constrain
resource adjustment. For instance, ABJ find that the cost stickiness is weaker when sales
revenue also declined in the preceding period, stronger during periods of macroeconomic
growth, and positively associated with the asset intensity and the employee intensity.
Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom (2004) find that the degree of cost stickiness
is influenced by capacity utilization. Banker, Byzalov, and Chen (2013) focus on crosscountry differences and find that the degree of cost stickiness is increasing in the strictness
of employment protection legislation, consistent with ABJ’s adjustment cost theory.
While the literature explains the asymmetric cost behavior using asymmetric cost decisions
of managers, behavioral factors affecting the cost decisions have been largely ignored in
the prior literature. A few exceptions are Dierynck, Landsman, and Renders (2012), Kama
and Weiss (2013), Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis (2012), and Banker, Jin, and Mehta (2018), all
of whom focused, either explicitly or implicitly, on CEOs as the ultimate decision makers.
Dierynck, Landsman, and Renders (2012), and Kama and Weiss (2013) find that incentives
to avoid losses and earnings decreases or to meet financial analysts’ earnings forecasts
managers expedite downward adjustments of slack resources when sales fall, lessening
cost stickiness. Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis (2012) find that managers’ incentives to grow
the firm beyond its optimal size or to maintain unutilized resources with the purpose of
increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige (i.e., empire
building incentives) induce greater cost stickiness. Banker, Jin, and Mehta (2018) focus
on managerial decision horizon and show that short-term cash bonus provides managers
with incentives to cut more slack resources and thus induce less cost stickiness while long-
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term incentives, such as stock option and restricted stock award, extend the managerial
decision horizon and thus induce more cost stickiness.
2.2 Middle managers
While prior studies in the cost stickiness literature generally regard a firm’s cost behavior
as a result of the asymmetry in the cost decisions either at the corporate level or by top
management, many cost-related decisions, including employment, asset acquisition, and
overall SG&A spending decisions, are made by middle managers, such as department
managers and regional managers, especially in decentralized firms. Middle managers and
their business decisions are important mainly because middle managers have significant
influence on strategic decision making process of the company. Middle managers are more
involved in the day-to-day operations of a company than top managers and are often said
to have their fingers on the “pulse of operation” (Kanter, 1982). Because of their deep
involvement into the day-to-day operations, middle managers have the opportunity to
report valuable information and suggestions from the inside of a company (Likert, 1961),
which makes them play a critical role in the corporate level decision making process. By
using bottom-up management processes, they communicate information and propose
issues for top management (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton et
al., 1997).3 The significant influence of middle managers on corporate decisions, including
investment in resource capacity decisions, suggests that firm-level cost behavior is also
heavily affected by middle management decisions.
What makes middle managers and their cost decisions even more important and thus
worth examining is that middle managers have characteristics distinct from those of
top managers. First, middle managers are likely to have more constraints in the decision
making process than top managers. The primary responsibility of a middle manager is
to implement a strategy, set by the top management, in an effective and efficient manner
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997; Huy, 2002; Delmestri & Walgenbach, 2005). During the
implementation process, however, middle managers tend to have limited ability in adding
resources, including human resources and long-term assets. Such a limit is typically set
by top managers only. Managerial discretion arises, at least partly, from the authority
to allocate the funds of the company to pursue their own interests (Mueller, 2003). This
suggests that if middle managers are given too much power on resource allocation and
pursue their own interests, for example, performance of the department, fewer resources
or funds will be left for top managers who have their own interests, for example, companylevel performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, top managers tend to
restrict middle managers’ ability and monitor their behaviors in order to prevent middle
managers from wasting the resources of the company and thereby limiting the top
management’s ability to utilize such resources (Williamson, 1975; Mueller, 2003).
3 For more insights into middle managers’ involvement in the strategy or decision making process, see Burgelman
(1983), Floyd & Wooldridge (1992a, 1992b, 1997, 1999), Huy (2001, 2002), Kanter (1988), Westley (1990), and
Wooldridge & Floyd (1990).
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Another distinctive characteristic of middle managers is that they are generally more risk
averse than top managers because their future is narrowly dependent on their current
tasks (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Shimizu, 2012). According to the
agency theory, principals use various forms of non-salary components in the compensation
package, such as cash bonus or long-term equity incentives, to provide risk-averse agents
with incentives to take risk (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; DeFusco, Johnson, & Zorn, 1990;
Murphy, 1999; Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002). However, the portion of non-salary incentives
is substantially smaller for middle managers compared to CEOs and other top managers
(Belcher & Atchison, 1987), suggesting that managerial decisions of middle managers are
likely to be more risk averse than those of top managers.
2.3 Research hypothesis
The distinctive characteristics of middle managers suggest that cost behavior at the middle
management level may look different from that at the company or top management level.
In specific, the cost stickiness theory assumes that companies’ or top managers’ ability to
add resources are relatively less limited than their ability to cut slack resources, and as a
result the relation between sales change and cost change is kinked at the point where sales
change equals zero, as illustrated in Figure 1A. On the other hand, the middle managers’
ability to change the level of cost or investment is limited for both adding and cutting as
discussed above. In addition, middle managers, who are relatively more risk averse than
top managers, are less likely to increase cost or investment substantially when the company
or the business unit experiences a huge increase in revenue, concerning the permanence
of the increase in demand. Based on this intuition, we formulate our main hypothesis as
follows:
Hypothesis: Middle managers’ decisions to change the level of cost or investment are
“sticky” when the magnitude of sales change is sufficiently large.
In other words, we predict that at the middle management level, costs change relatively less
not only when sales decrease (or when the magnitude of sales decrease is large), but also
when the magnitude of sales increase is sufficiently large. This suggests that the relation
between sales change and cost change at the middle management level is expected to be
kinked at two different points as illustrated in Figure 1B. The main objectives of this study
include (1) examining how costs behave at the middle management level (and especially
if the cost behavior is consistent with our prediction) and (2) providing an explanation for
the observed behavior based on qualitative information obtained through the survey and
the interviews.
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Figure 1: Graphical illustrations of SG&A cost behavior

Note: Figure 1A, drawn based on the theory of Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003), illustrates the
asymmetric SG&A cost behavior, “cost stickiness”. The relation can be described as SG&A costs changing
relatively less when sales decrease than when sales increase by an equivalent amount. The line is kinked at %
change in sales revenue = 0. The y-intercept is not necessarily zero.
Figure 1B illustrates the behavior of SG&A costs at the middle management level. The non-linear costs-sales
relation can be described as SG&A cost changing relatively less when the change in sales revenue is sufficiently
large in magnitude. The flatter parts at both ends are not necessarily parallel to each other.

3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Surveys and interviews
To examine the characteristics of middle management cost decisions and also to
complement prior studies in the cost stickiness literature, we use a combination of a
survey instrument and field interviews in this study. The prior literature on cost stickiness
relies heavily on archival firm-level data. The main advantage of using archival data is
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that it enables researchers to perform relatively objective analyses based on historical
real data. As discussed by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), however, studies based
on archival analyses can also suffer from several weaknesses related to model/variable
specification. In most cases, a regression analysis cannot be entirely free from model/
variable misspecification or measurement error. Sometimes it is also difficult to develop
a good economic proxy. Another weakness of archival studies is the inability to ask
qualitative questions. In contrast, surveys and interviews provide an opportunity to ask
managers very specific and qualitative questions about the motivation behind managerial
decisions without relying on potentially misspecified regression models (Graham, Harvey,
& Rajgopal, 2005). On the other hand, potential caveats related to surveys and interviews
include subjective or biased inputs from survey respondents or interviewees.
In this study, we mainly use a combination of a survey instrument and field interviews for
the purpose of complementing those archival studies in the prior literature. Specifically,
surveys and interviews enable us to examine the characteristics of middle managers’
resource capacity decisions without worrying about any model specification issues which
have been previously addressed in the literature (e.g., Balakrishnan, Labro, & Soderstrom,
2014; Banker & Byzalov, 2014). In addition, surveys and field interviews provide us with
an opportunity to identify factors affecting managerial resource capacity decisions, which
are not easily identifiable using archival data. Considering the potential caveats associated
with surveys and interviews, we also conduct an empirical analysis based on archival data
as an additional analysis to back up our main findings from the surveys and interviews.4
3.2 Research design
We developed a survey instrument based on a review of the cost stickiness literature.
In specific, we designed the main survey questions to ask how a manager’s decisions to
adjust overall SG&A expenditure, as well as the capacity level of individual resources,
including human resources, long-term assets, raw materials and merchandises, vary under
hypothetical scenarios regarding sales change. In addition, qualitative questions were
asked to identify limitations in the resource capacity decisions and other affecting factors.
The survey contained 25 questions including: 13 questions about respondents and their
companies and 12 quantitative and qualitative questions addressing their cost decisions.
The interviews were designed to obtain more detailed qualitative information about
decision behavior at the middle management level, as well as impact factors and limitations
in the decision making process. The potential interviewees were contacted using our
personal network, a basic introduction was provided through a telephone/email briefing
and then the 25 survey questions were sent. The main telephone interviews asking about
detailed decision-making mechanisms were conducted about a week after the survey
questionnaires were sent.
4 See Section 5.3 for the detailed model and sample data for the empirical analysis.
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DATA

We used the Cint service to recruit 175 U.S.-based respondents who were identified as
middle managers.5, 6 After manually identifying 23 responses with an error (e.g., using dollar
amounts instead of percentages) and spam responses, 152 valid responses remained for
quantitative and qualitative analyses. Table 1 presents self-reported summary information
about demographic characteristics of the sample companies and respondents. The survey
gathered information frequently used in empirical research for subsample analyses to
consider potential conditioning effects.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A – Demographic characteristics of sample companies (n = 152)
Avg. sales revenue for past 5 years

Percent

Years of operation

Percent

< $200,000

4.6

0-5 years

3.9

$200,000 - $500,000

7.9

5-10 years

25.0

$500,000 - $1,000,000

17.8

10-20 years

28.9

$1,000,000 - $1,500,000

21.1

20-30 years

21.7

$1,500,000 - $2,000,000

15.8

> 30 years

20.4

> $2,000,000

32.9

SG&A as % of sales revenue

Industry

0-5%

3.9

Construction

17.8

5-10%

21.7

Manufacturing

15.1

10-20%

27.6

Transportation and Utilities

5.3

20-30%

23.0

Wholesalers and Retailers

7.9

30-50%

16.4

Financial Services

12.5

> 50%

7.2

Business Services

17.8

Consumer Services

13.8

Public Administration and Other

9.9

Number of employees
≤ 10

2.6

11-50

18.4

51-100

17.8

101-500

28.9

> 500

32.2

5 Cint is a market research company which has access to a large number of preregistered members who vary in
demographics and other social characteristics (e.g., occupation or title). Once a client selects a target respondent
group, Cint sends the client’s survey until it collects a predetermined number of responses. Our survey was sent
to 459 middle managers in the U.S. and completed by 175 of them (i.e., the response rate was 38.3%).
6 In the survey, a qualifying question asking respondents to self-identify their job title was also included.
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Panel B – Demographic characteristics of sample managers (n = 152)
Primary responsibility
Hiring

Percent

Gender

Percent

5.9

Male

64.5

Purchasing

7.2

Female

35.5

Production

15.1

Sales & Marketing

11.2

Age

Year

Accounting & Finance

11.8

Mean

39

Administration

19.1

25th percentile

32

General management

29.6

50th percentile (median)

36

75th percentile

42

Experience at current position
0-3 years

15.1

Total annual compensation

3-5 years

21.7

Mean

82.6

5-10 years

40.1

25th percentile

60.0

10-15 years

17.8

50th percentile (median)

80.0

> 15 years

5.3

75th percentile

100.0

Experience in current industry

Composition of compensation package
(as % of total comp.)

$ thousand

Avg. Percent

0-3 years

5.3

Fixed salary

70.9

3-5 years

14.5

Short-term cash bonus

11.7

5-10 years

32.9

Long-term incentives

7.0

10-15 years

23.7

Pension

5.3

> 15 years

23.7

Perks and other

5.1

Note: Table 1 presents demographic characteristics of sample companies (Panel A) and managers (Panel B).
Revealing the dollar amount of total annual compensation was optional. 151 out of 152 respondents chose to
answer this question.
For the mean calculation, all amounts greater than $150,000 were treated equal to $150,000. Considering only
six out of 151 valid responses were $150,000, the effect of potential understatement is expected to be minimal.

Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample companies. Our sample
companies range from small to large in terms of average sales revenue and number of
employees. In specific, 30.3% of the sample firms were relatively small with less than $1
million of average sales revenue, while 32.9% were relatively large firms earning more
than $2 million of sales revenue per year. Also, 32.2% of the firms had more than 500
employees. For more than half of the companies, SG&A costs were between 10% and 30%
of sales revenue, comparable to the statistics reported in the previous archival studies (e.g.,
ABJ). Most of the companies (96.1%) have operated for more than five years. The industry
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distribution indicates that the sample firms are from a wide range of industries, which
reduces the concern with sample clustering.
Panel B reports demographic information of the sample managers (i.e., survey respondents).
While various roles are played by sample managers, the largest group consists of general
managers (29.6%), who are expected to have the most influence over SG&A spending
for the business unit. Most of the respondents have experience of 3 years or longer either
at their current position or in the current industry. The mean age was 39 and about two
thirds of the sample managers were male. On average, total annual compensation was
$82.6 thousand, which consists of 70.9% of fixed annual salary, 18.7% of short-term or
long-term incentives, and 10.4% of other types. The large portion of fixed salary suggests
that the compensation structure of middle managers is very different from that of top
executives who typically receive significant portions of total compensation as incentives.7
5

RESULTS

5.1 Quantitative analysis
5.1.1

SG&A cost decisions of middle managers

To gauge the degree to which middle managers are willing to change the overall SG&A
spending for a given sales change, we asked the following hypothetical question:
Hypothetical question: Assume sales have been increasing for the past five years. How
much change in SG&A costs would you make under the following situations?8
1. when sales growth this year is 0%?
2. when sales increase by 5%? 10%? 15%?
3. when sales decrease by 5%? 10%? 15%?
The two extreme situations, 15% increase and 15% decrease, are still considered within
the normal range of annual sales change, which also means that the responses for these
scenarios are considered a normal operational decision. The assumption of past sales

7 Banker, Jin, and Mehta (2018) report that on average, a CEO of a S&P 1500 company receives 68.2% of the total
compensation in the form of incentives.
8 The survey asked respondents’ decisions regarding SG&A costs, as well as other cost items. The responses for
SG&A cost, the main cost item in the cost stickiness literature, are separated from others for reporting purposes.
See Table 3 for responses for the rest of the cost items.
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increase was given considering that managers’ positive expectation for future sales is the
main assumption in the cost stickiness theory (ABJ).9
Table 2: Survey responses to the question: “How much change in SG&A costs would you make
under the following situations?”
Change in SG&A costs (%)
Hypothetical situation

Mean

When sales growth this year
is 0%

4.53%

Comparison
with prior
range

One-tailed
p-value

25th
percentile

50th
percentile
(median)

75th
percentile

0.00%

5.00%

5.00%

When sales increase by …
5%

6.40%

+1.87%***

0.01

0.75%

5.00%

6.00%

10%

7.03%

+0.63%

0.31

1.00%

5.00%

7.25%

15%

7.28%

+0.26%

0.39

2.00%

5.00%

10.00%

5%

2.78%

-1.75%***

< 0.01

0.00%

0.00%

5.00%

10%

2.85%

+0.07%

0.54

0.00%

0.00%

5.00%

15%

2.06%

-0.79%*

0.07

0.00%

0.00%

5.00%

When sales decrease by …

Note: Table 2 summarizes the survey response to the question “How much change in SG&A costs would you
make” under various scenarios regarding sales change. Respondents are given the assumption that sales have
been increasing for the past five years.
“Comparison with prior range” column presents the mean comparison between ranges regarding sales change.
For ranges of sales increase, it is tested whether the mean SG&A cost change for the range is statistically larger
than that for the previous sales increase range. (E.g., for the situation of +10% sales change, it is tested whether
the mean response is statistically greater than the mean response for the +5% sales change.) For ranges of sales
decrease, it is tested whether the mean SG&A cost change for the range is statistically smaller than that for the
previous sales decrease range. (E.g., for the situation of -10% sales change, it is tested whether the mean response
is statistically smaller than the mean response for the -5% sales change.) *, **, and *** denote significance at levels
of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Table 2 presents the summary of the responses. Empirical studies in the cost stickiness
literature generally use the zero sales change as the point where the slope of the sales-costs
relation changes, meaning the cost decisions at zero sales growth may serve as a benchmark
when examining whether the cost behavior is sticky. On average, the respondents indicate
that they are willing to increase overall SG&A costs by 4.53% even when sales revenue does
not grow at all in the current period. A potential explanation for this positive cost change
is that the managers are optimistic and believe the sales will rise in the future. Considering
9 Prior literature also finds that costs are “anti-sticky” (i.e., costs change relatively more when sales decrease than
when sales increase) when managers are pessimistic about future sales revenue (Banker et al., 2014).
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the respondents are middle managers, another explanation is that there is a corporate-level
strategy or policy to follow regarding the minimum level of SG&A spending.
Next, the responses for the scenarios of sales increase indicate that middle managers
tend to increase overall SG&A spending as expected sales growth increases, as intuitively
expected. More interestingly, the increase in SG&A cost change is mitigated as sales growth
increases, suggesting that middle managers increase SG&A spending relatively less when
the magnitude of sales increase is large compared to when the magnitude of sales increase
is small. In particular, the mean response was to add 1.87% (= 6.40% - 4.53%) extra SG&A
spending when sales growth changes from 0% to +5%. However, the extra increase in
SG&A spending drops to 0.63% (= 7.03% - 6.40%) when sales growth changes from +5%
to +10% and further drops to 0.25% (= 7.28% - 7.03%) when sales growth changes from
+10% to +15%. The difference in means was statistically significant only for 0% vs. +5%
and insignificant at the conventional level of significance for +5% vs. +10% and +10%
vs. +15%. This is consistent with our expectation based on the characteristics of middle
management including limited ability in adding resources and risk aversion.
Last, the responses for the scenarios of sales decrease indicate that middle managers tend
to reduce the increase in overall SG&A spending as sales decrease, again, as intuitively
expected. Similarly to the case of sales increase, the degree of the SG&A cost change is
relatively smaller when the sales decrease is large compared to when the sales decrease
is small. In particular, the extra cut in the SG&A spending was 1.75% (= 4.53% - 2.78%,
p-value < 0.01) when sales growth changes from 0% to -5%. However, the cut in the
SG&A cost is substantially mitigated when sales growth drops further. In particular,
the difference in mean cost changes between -10% and -15% sales growth scenarios is
statistically insignificant. The additional SG&A cut when sales growth further drops
from -10% to -15% was 0.79% (= 2.85% - 2.06%, p-value = 0.07), which is insignificant
at the conventional level of significance (p-value < 0.05) and much smaller in magnitude
compared to 1.75%, the SG&A cut for the sales growth range between 0% and -5%. The
relatively smaller decrease in SG&A costs for a large sales decrease is consistent with the
empirical findings in the prior cost stickiness literature (e.g., ABJ). It is also consistent with
our expectation based on (1) limited ability of middle managers and (2) risk aversion by
middle managers.
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Figure 2: Sticky SG&A cost decision of middle managers

Note: Figure 2 presents the mean and median survey responses to the question “How much change in SG&A
costs would you make?” given the sales growth in this year is 0%, +5%, +10%, +15%, -5%, -10%, and -15%. The
respondents are given the assumption that sales have been increasing for the past five years.

Figure 2 graphically summarizes the non-linear SG&A cost decisions of middle managers
observed from the survey responses. For the line representing the mean responses, the
slope is relatively steeper when the sales change is relatively small in magnitude (from
-5% to +5%) and relatively flatter when the sales change is relatively large in magnitude
(-5% or lower and +5% or higher). Similarly, the median response of 0% of SG&A cost
change for -5% sales change does not decrease further when the magnitude of sales
decrease gets larger and the median response of 5% for zero sales growth does not rise
when the expected sales growth increases. Overall, the non-linear cost behavior of middle
managers shown in Figure 2 is consistent with our expectation.
The shape of the two plots in Figure 2 also suggests that while the empirical models in the
prior cost stickiness literature generally use zero sales growth as the point where the slope
changes, the change in managerial behavior may not be triggered by a mere sales decrease.
Figure 2 suggests that it is rather a “sufficient large” sales decrease. More generally, the cost
behavior at the middle management level can be described as costs changing relatively less
when the magnitude of sales change (i.e., sales increase or decrease) is sufficiently large.10

10 The criteria for being “sufficiently large” are not necessarily the same for sales increase and for sales decrease.
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5.1.2 Other cost and investment decisions of middle managers

While the prior literature on cost stickiness focuses on SG&A costs, where managers
are supposed to have the most discretion, we also examine middle managers’ decisions
regarding other cost and investment items. Similarly to the main questions about SG&A
cost decisions, we asked the following question for (1) human resources (i.e., hiring and
firing), (2) investment in fixed assets (e.g., machine and equipment), and (3) investment
in intangible assets (e.g., patent and software):
Hypothetical question: Assume sales have been increasing for the past five years. How
much change in cost or investment would you make under the following situations?
1. when sales growth this year is 0%?
2. when sales increase by 5%? 10%? 15%?
3. when sales decrease by 5%? 10%? 15%?
For these cost and investment decisions on which managers are supposed to have relatively
smaller discretion compared to that on SG&A cost decisions, we excluded responses of the
managers who self-reported that they have weak or no discretion on the corresponding
decision.
The survey responses summarized in Table 3 and Figure 3 show a pattern very similar
to that of SG&A cost decisions shown in Table 2 and Figure 2. In specific, the mean
and median responses show that the change in the cost or investment is less sensitive to
the change in sales revenue when the magnitude of sales change is relatively large. This
suggests that first, similarly to the case of SG&A costs, the magnitude of employee layoffs
or cut in asset investments by middle managers is relatively small when the magnitude
of sales decline is sufficiently large, consistent with the cost stickiness theory and our
prediction. Second, also similarly to the case of SG&A costs, middle managers do not
want to substantially increase the number of employees or investments in assets when
experiencing a sales boom, which is consistent with our hypothesis.
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Table 3: Survey responses to the question: “How much change in cost or investment would you
make under the following situations?”
Change in number of
employees (%)

Change in fixed asset
investment (%)

Change in intangible
asset investment (%)

Hypothetical situation

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

When sales growth this year
is 0%

6.02%

2.00%

6.24%

4.00%

4.98%

5.00%

5%

6.48%

5.00%

5.58%

4.00%

6.40%

5.00%

10%

9.15%

5.00%

7.03%

5.00%

7.03%

5.00%

15%

8.92%

5.00%

7.28%

5.00%

7.28%

5.00%

5%

3.58%

0.00%

2.78%

0.00%

2.78%

0.00%

10%

2.75%

0.00%

2.85%

0.00%

2.85%

0.00%

15%

2.52%

1.00%

2.06%

0.00%

2.06%

0.00%

When sales increase by …

When sales decrease by …

Note: Table 3 summarizes survey responses to the question asking the intended level of change in number of
employees, fixed asset investment, and intangible asset investment. The responses of managers who self-reported
that they have weak or no discretion on the corresponding cost or investment item are excluded. The number of
responses is 130 for employment, 117 for fixed asset investment, and 126 for intangible asset investment.
Respondents are given the assumption that sales have been increasing for the past five years.

Figure 3: Employment and asset investment decisions of middle managers
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Note: Figure 3 presents the mean and median survey responses to the question “How much change in cost or
investment would you make?” given the sales growth in this year is 0%, +5%, +10%, +15%, -5%, -10%, and -15%.
The respondents are given the assumption that sales have been increasing for the past five years. Figures 3A, 3B,
and 3C are for the number of employees, fixed asset investment, and intangible asset investment, respectively.

5.1.3 Subsample analysis of the impact of compensation structure
One of our explanations for the reverse Z-shaped cost behavior at the middle management
level is that middle managers are likely to be more risk averse than top managers, due
to their compensation structure which includes a relatively small portion of incentives.
To test the validity of this explanation, we conducted a subsample analysis. Using the
median value of total incentives as a percentage of total annual compensation (20.0%), we
constructed two subsamples and repeated the main analysis described above for each of
the two subsamples.11

11 Total incentive is defined as the sum of short-term cash bonus and long-term incentives.
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Table 4: Subsample analysis of the impact of the compensation structure
Change in SG&A costs (%)
Managers with small incentives
(≤ 20% of total compensation)
(n = 101)
Hypothetical situation

Mean

When sales growth this
year is 0%

4.94%

Comparison
with prior
range

Managers with large incentives
(> 20% of total compensation)
(n = 51)

50th
percentile
(median)

Mean

5.00%

3.73%

Comparison
with prior
range

50th
percentile
(median)
2.00%

When sales increase by …
5%

7.06%

+2.12%**

5.00%

5.10%

+1.37%**

3.00%

10%

7.72%

+0.66%

5.00%

5.65%

+0.55%

5.00%

15%

7.37%

-0.36%

5.00%

7.12%

+1.47%**

5.00%

5%

2.45%

-2.49%***

0.00%

3.45%

-0.27%

2.00%

10%

2.71%

+0.27%

0.00%

3.12%

-0.33%

2.00%

15%

2.07%

-0.64%

0.00%

2.04%

-1.08%

2.00%

When sales decrease by …

Note: Table 4 presents the results of the subsample analysis performed to examine the impact of the compensation
structure on cost decisions. Using the median value of total incentives (= cash bonus + long-term incentives)
as a percentage of total compensation, two subsamples have been constructed. “Comparison with prior range”
column presents the mean comparison between ranges regarding sales change. For ranges of sales increase, it is
tested whether the mean SG&A cost change for the range is statistically larger than that for the previous sales
increase range. (E.g., for the situation of +10% sales change, it is tested whether the mean response is statistically
greater than the mean response for the +5% sales change.) For ranges of sales decrease, it is tested whether the
mean SG&A cost change for the range is statistically smaller than that for the previous sales decrease range. (E.g.,
for the situation of -10% sales change, it is tested whether the mean response is statistically smaller than the mean
response for the -5% sales change.) *, **, and *** denote significance at levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Figure 4: Subsample analysis of the impact of compensation structure
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Note: Figure 4 presents the mean and median survey responses to the question “How much change in SG&A costs
would you make?” for two subsamples constructed based on the compensation structure. The respondents are
given the assumption that sales have been increasing for the past five years. Figure 4A summarizes the responses
of the managers who receive equal to or less than 20% of total compensation as incentives. Figure 4B summarizes
the responses of the managers who receive more than 20% of total compensation as incentives.

Table 4 and Figure 4 present the results of the subsample analysis. For the middle managers
who receive relatively small incentives (equal to or less than 20% of total compensation),
the responses remain very similar to those for the main sample (i.e., change in SG&A
costs is relatively small when the magnitude of sales change is large). On the other hand,
the responses of the middle managers who receive relatively large incentives (greater than
20% of total compensation) show that the “sticky” cost behavior at the higher end is less
significant. In specific, Table 4 shows that the increase in the mean response when sales
growth increases from 10% to 15% is statistically significant (one-tailed p-value = 0.025),
suggesting that the increase in SG&A spending is not mitigated even when sales growth
reaches 15%. The median also rises at least until the sales growth reaches 10%, unlike
the case for the main sample or the subsample of middle managers with small incentives
where the median does not increase at all in the range of increasing sales. The difference
in the cost behavior between the two subsamples can be more easily identified in Figure
4. Overall, the result of the subsample analysis suggests that middle managers who receive
compensation relatively more in the form of incentives are less likely to slow down in
adding resources when experiencing a sales boom, which supports our expectation that
incentive compensation mitigates the risk-averse behavior of managers.
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5.2 Qualitative analysis
5.2.1

Survey

To obtain a better understanding of the cost behavior at middle management level, we also
asked qualitative questions in the survey in addition to the quantitative questions discussed
above. First, we asked which factors affected their cost decisions in the quantitative section.
From the prior literature on cost stickiness, we obtained potential factors as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Economy
Company’s past performance
Long-term relation between company and employees
Morale of employees
Short-term cash bonus
Long-term incentives
Expenses related to hiring/firing process (e.g., training fees, severance pay)
Expenses related to machine/equipment (e.g., installation fees, transportation fees)

The question has been asked using a 5-point Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1=No impact,
2=Minor impact, 3=Neutral, 4=Moderate impact, 5=Major impact). In addition, we also
asked if there were any other factors which affected their decision-making process.
Figure 5: Factors affecting middle managers’ cost decisions
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Note: Figure 5 summarizes the survey responses regarding factors affecting cost decisions at the middle
management level. For each factor obtained from the prior literature, respondents were asked to indicate the
significance of the impact using a 5-point Likert scale (1=No impact, 2=Minor impact, 3=Neutral, 4=Moderate
impact, 5=Major impact).

Figure 5 summarizes the responses regarding the impact of each factor. Figure 5A shows
that all the potential factors were identified to have at least a moderate impact by 50%
or more respondents. A relatively small number of respondents indicated short-term
cash bonus (50.0%) or long-term incentives (61.2%) as a factor with a major or moderate
impact, consistent with the fact that only 11.7% and 7.0% of total compensation are
received in the form of short-term cash bonus and long-term incentives, respectively.
Figure 5B shows that the most respondents (32.2%) selected the economy as a factor with
a major impact on their cost decisions, which supports the argument in the prior literature
that the economic condition affects managers’ belief about permanence of the current
sales decline, ultimately affecting their cost decisions (ABJ; Banker et al., 2014). Again, a
relatively small number of respondents (21.1%) chose short-term cash bonus as a factor
with a major impact on their cost decisions.
The respondents also indicated that their cost and investment decisions are affected by
several factors in addition to those provided from the survey. Based on their nature, we
classified those additional factors as follows:
• Factors restricting middle managers’ cost or investment decisions
–– Annual budget or availability of cash
–– Minimum acceptable rate of return
–– Availability of qualified labor force
–– Long-standing contracts with suppliers
–– Corporate level strategy
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• Other additional factors
–– General trend in business or market
–– Behavior or strategy of main competitor(s)
–– Needs from customers or clients
Consistent with our prediction, many respondents indicated that there are factors which
limit their cost or investment decisions. First, annual budget and availability of cash
directly limit the middle managers’ ability to add resources. Also, minimum acceptable
rate of return, which is often demanded by top managers, forces middle managers to limit
their expenses to maintain a high return. In addition, middle managers’ employmentrelated decisions are also affected by availability of qualified labor force for the current
period. These factors are likely to set the upper limit in increasing costs, consistent with
the relatively small increase in costs when the sales increase is large as shown in Table 2
and Figure 2. On the other hand, long-standing contracts with suppliers are likely to set a
contractual minimum (i.e., the lower limit) for raw material or merchandise purchase per
year, resulting in limited ability in cutting resources, consistent with the relatively small
change in costs when the magnitude of sales decrease is large. Many respondents also
indicated their decisions are significantly affected by corporate- or top management-level
strategy such as globalization or increasing market share, which can set either an upward
limit or a downward limit, depending on its nature.
Respondents also reported additional factors which do not necessarily restrict their
decisions. Those factors include (1) general trends in the market or industry, (2) strategy
or behavior of their major competitors, and (3) needs from their clients or customers.
These responses confirm the widely-accepted fact that management decisions are heavily
influenced by Porter’s (1979) five forces (i.e., industry rivalry, bargain powers of buyers/
suppliers, threats of new entrants/substitutes).
Last, the survey directly asked the participants if there was any personal or corporate policy
or strategy to follow regarding the maximum and minimum levels of cost or investment.
The results summarized in Figure 6 show that a significant number of respondents have
a certain policy to follow when making cost or investment decisions. In specific, 37.1%
of valid responses indicated the existence of a personal or corporate policy regarding the
maximum level of cost or investment. Specific examples include an increase in SG&A
expenses by a maximum of 5% from the prior period’s expenses, a maximum number of
line workers limited due to factory or equipment capacity, maximum SG&A spending
limited to the annual budget, etc. Regarding the minimum level of cost or investment,
42.3% of valid responses indicated the existence of a restricting policy. Examples include
an increasing number of temporary workers by 1% every year, not cutting SG&A spending
regardless of performance, spending all the budget given for the period, etc. Interestingly,
the annual budget seems to serve as both the upper limit and the lower limit for cost and
investment decisions.
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Overall, the result of the qualitative analysis suggests that middle managers are likely to
face the upper limit and/or the lower limit when making a cost or investment decision,
which explains the reverse Z-shape of cost-sales relation identified from the quantitative
analysis.
Figure 6: Existence of policy, strategy, or norm regarding the minimum or maximum level of
annual investment

Note: Figure 6 summarizes the survey responses to the question asking if there is any policy, strategy, or norm
regarding the minimum or maximum level of annual investment. Many of the respondents who answered “Yes”
to the question also provided a description of the policy or strategy. The examples of policies for the maximum
level include (1) the increase in SG&A cost limited to a certain percentage of prior SG&A costs and (2) the
maximum number of line workers limited due to the factory capacity. The examples for the minimum level
include (1) not cutting SG&A cost regardless of the current performance and (2) spending all the budget given
for the period.

5.2.2 Interview
To obtain an even deeper understanding of the decision-making mechanism at the middle
management level, we conducted interviews with two middle managers currently in
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practice, who were selected and approached using our personal network; Manager A is
a director of client services at a company which provides seismic data to the oil and gas
industry; Manager B is a production manager at a manufacturer of custom molded plastic
parts. As a part of the briefing, our survey questionnaires were provided to each of the
interviewees and the actual interviews were conducted a few days later through telephone.
Similarly to the survey respondents, both of the interviewees indicated that their decisions
to add or cut resources are affected by top management and/or other factors, although the
degree varies.
Manager A, who self-reported that he has “a great deal of discretion” in terms of spending
and resource allocation, stated:
“If I think a $500 resource is needed for an operation or a project, I simply spend the
capital and continue. However, if the resource needed approaches the $10,000 mark,
I send it to upper management for confirmation before executing the order … My
discretion range to give raises (to the employees) is 3-5%, without consulting or pushback from top management. If I want to consider an employee for a 10% raise, then this
requires approval at the executive level and from upper management.”
Similarly, Manager B, who exercises a “moderate level of discretion” in terms of spending
and human resource allocation, stated:
“(SG&A spending) is rarely my complete decision but rather the committee’s that I
work and consult with. I need to go through upper management for most of the major
decisions.”
These statements suggest that their managerial decisions to increase spending are limited
by top management, although the degree varies, which is consistent with the survey
responses in general.
Regarding the factors affecting their resource allocation decisions, Manager A stated:
“We are in a “sales driven” business and have to maintain an operation that can react and
bring a deal to fruition within a quick delivery window, closing out the few competitors
we do have. There are about ten other companies we compete with domestically, so this
makes it easy for customers to work with us, as they know who has the services in this
field.”
This implies that competitors and customers are limiting his discretion in cutting
resources to a certain degree, as many survey respondents also indicated. On the other
hand, Manager B stressed the significant influence of company-level strategy:
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“Prior to 2009, the company was in a growth stage as was the industry (and thus my
discretion in cutting resources was limited) … On the contrary, subsequent to the 2009
economic upheaval, the industry, and my company as well, have yet to truly recover
from the recession (meaning my discretion in increasing costs is somewhat limited.)”
To summarize, the interview statements are consistent with our intuition and observation
from the survey. Although the real world decision making processes, identified during the
interviews, are much more complicated and dynamic compared to the simplified plots
we have drawn from the survey results, the interviews confirmed at least that middle
managers’ discretion in spending decisions is limited both upward and downward and the
limiting factors include top managers and their strategies.
5.3 Empirical analysis
Middle managers include heads of business segments, such as division managers and
regional managers, who can be reasonably considered to have the most significant influence
on the segment level cost decisions. As such, we also conducted an empirical analysis using
segment level data obtained from Compustat, which covers all publicly traded companies
in the U.S., to complement our findings from the survey and field interviews. Our sample
period spans fiscal years 2008–2015 and the number of segment/year observations was
26,050.12
Cost behavior at the middle management (or segment) level was examined using the
following regression model:
ΔSG&At = β0 + β1 ΔREVt + β2 DECt × ΔREVt + β3 DECt × ΔREVt × SUCCESSIVE_DECt
+ β4 DECt × ΔREVt × ASSETINTt + β5 LARGE_INCt × ΔREVt
+ Industry/Year Fixed Effects
(1)
where ΔSG&A is natural logarithm of current SG&A costs over prior SG&A costs and
ΔREV is natural logarithm of current sales revenue over prior sales revenue. Both ΔSG&A
and ΔREV are winsorized at the 1% level. DEC is a dummy variable which takes the value
of 1 if sales revenue of the firm decreases in the current period, and 0 otherwise. Similar
to ABJ, a negative β2 would indicate that costs decrease relatively less when sales decrease.
We also include interaction terms containing a dummy variable for successive sales
decrease (SUCCESSIVE_DEC = 1 if sales decrease for two consecutive years) and asset
intensity (ASSETINT = log (total assets / sales revenue)), considering the factors affecting
the degree of cost stickiness. We use dummy variables based on the two-digit Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) codes and year dummies to control for the industry and year
fixed effects, respectively. The main variable of interest is the interaction term containing
12 Our sample period spans 8 years (2008-2015), since our data source, Compustat’s Current Segments database,
provides information for the past 8 years.
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LARGE_INC, a dummy variable for a large sales increase, which is defined using different
values of sales increase. (See Note for Table 5 for detailed variable definitions.) A negative
β5 would indicate that SG&A costs become sticky when the magnitude of sales increase
reaches a given level of sales increase.
Table 5: Regression analysis of SG&A cost behavior at the segment level
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

VARIABLES

ΔSG&At

ΔSG&At

ΔSG&At

ΔSG&At

ΔSG&At

ΔREVt

0.403***

0.341***

0.424***

0.487***

0.537***

(68.93)

(9.67)

(14.07)

(18.68)

(23.30)

-0.093***

-0.029

-0.115***

-0.182***

-0.238***

(-6.59)

(-0.74)

(-3.37)

(-5.96)

(-8.50)

0.093***

0.094***

0.093***

0.093***

0.092***

(6.26)

(6.29)

(6.25)

(6.21)

(6.18)

-0.046***

-0.047***

-0.046***

-0.046***

-0.045***

(-15.31)

(-15.40)

(-15.18)

(-14.94)

(-14.68)

DECt×ΔREVt
DECt×ΔREVt×SUCCESSIVE_DECt
DECt×ΔREVt×ASSETINTt
LARGE_INC15t×ΔREVt

0.061*
(1.79)

LARGE_INC20t×ΔREVt

-0.021
(-0.72)

LARGE_INC25t×ΔREVt

-0.083***
(-3.30)

LARGE_INC30t×ΔREVt

-0.133***
(-6.01)

Constant

0.033***

0.035***

0.032***

0.029***

0.025***

(13.78)

(13.57)

(12.21)

(10.65)

(9.08)

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Observations

26,050

26,050

26,050

26,050

26,050

Adjusted R-squared

0.217

0.217

0.217

0.218

0.218

Industry/Year Fixed Effects

Note: Table 5 presents the results of the multivariate regression analysis based on 26,050 segment/year
observations.
*, **, and *** denote significance at levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses.
SG&At = Selling, general, and administrative costs in year t (in million $); ΔSG&At = Log (SG&At / SG&At-1);
REVt = Sales revenue in year t (in million $); ΔREVt = Log (REVt / REVt-1); DECt = 1 if REVt < REVt-1, = 0
otherwise; SUCCESSIVE_DECt = 1 if REVt-1 < REVt-2, = 0 otherwise; TAt = Total assets (in million $); ASSETINTt
= Log (TAt / REVt); LARGE_INC15t = 1 if ΔREVt > 0.15, = 0 otherwise; LARGE_INC20t = 1 if ΔREVt > 0.20, = 0
otherwise; LARGE_INC25t = 1 if ΔREVt > 0.25, = 0 otherwise; LARGE_INC30t = 1 if ΔREVt > 0.30, = 0 otherwise.
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The regression results are presented in Table 5. Consistent with the prior literature, the
coefficient on DEC×ΔREV is significant and negative in general, indicating that cost
becomes sticky when sales decrease. The coefficient on SUCCESSIVE_DEC interaction
term is significant and positive in general, suggesting a lower degree of SG&A cost
stickiness at the lower end when sales decline for two consecutive years. The significant
and negative coefficients on ASSETINT interaction term indicate that SG&A costs are
stickier at the lower end for firms that require relatively more assets to support their sales.
Most interestingly, the coefficients on the interaction term for a large sales increase show
that cost becomes sticky when the magnitude of sales increase is “sufficiently” large. In
specific, the coefficients are not significantly negative when the sufficiently large sales
increase is defined as ΔREV of 0.15 or higher (Column (2)) or 0.2 or higher (Column (3)),
suggesting that a sales increase up to about 20% does not trigger the cost stickiness at the
higher end. The coefficient becomes significantly negative when the sufficiently large sales
increase is defined as ΔREV of 0.25 or higher (Column (4)), suggesting that approximately
25% change in sales revenue is sufficiently large to induce sticky cost behavior at the
higher end. Considering that a significant portion of the sample (20.9%) has ΔREV of 0.25
or higher (untabulated), the conditions that trigger sticky cost behavior at the higher end
(e.g., 25% sales increase) are still considered normal rather than extreme. The negative
coefficient becomes even more significant and larger in magnitude when ΔREV of 0.3
is used to define the dummy variable (Column (5)), as intuitively expected. Overall, the
regression results based on segment level data suggest that cost behavior at the segment
level is sticky not only when sales decrease but also when the magnitude of sales increase is
large, consistent with our findings from the survey instrument and the interviews.
6

DISCUSSION WITH CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Theoretical contributions
Decisions at the middle management level are different from those at the top management
or corporate level because middle managers are likely to have limited ability in both adding
and cutting resources and also because the salary-focused compensation structure for
middle managers are likely to induce more risk-averse behavior. In this study, we examine
cost behavior at the middle management level using two different approaches.
First, we take a behavioral approach and conduct a survey and field interviews. The analysis
results based on the detailed interviews and 152 survey responses indicate that middle
managers’ cost decisions are sticky (i.e., change relatively less) when the magnitude of sales
change is sufficiently large at both increasing and decreasing ends. Our findings contribute
to the prior literature on cost stickiness by suggesting the existence of stickiness at the
higher end (i.e., when the sales increase is large) at least at the middle management level
and also by confirming the empirical findings in the literature using behavior approaches.
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Second, we use archival data to empirically confirm our findings from the survey and the
interviews. Using a regression analysis based on 26,050 segment-level observations for
publicly traded companies in the U.S., we show that cost decisions at the segment level
are sticky at both low and high ends, consistent with our findings from the survey and the
interviews. Using segment level data also contributes to the prior literature which relies
heavily on company level data and examines the cost asymmetry at the low end only (i.e.,
firms facing a sales decline).
6.2 Practical implications
Middle managers’ cost decisions, which are sticky not only when sales decrease but
also when the magnitude of sales increase is large, have practical implications for both
top managers and investors. For top managers, the sticky cost behavior at the high end
suggests that the cost decisions of middle managers are restricted by annual budgets and
corporate-level strategies or policies, as evidenced by the survey results and the interviews.
This further suggests that a company may face an undesirable situation of losing an
opportunity to grow because investments or expenditures at the middle management level
are restricted for internal reasons.
For investors and analysts, the sticky cost behavior at the high end suggests that analysts’
earnings forecasts are likely to be biased when the magnitude of sales increase is large.
Banker, Jin, and Mehta (2018) argue that if analysts fail to fully consider the cost stickiness
(at the low end), costs of firms facing sales decline will be under-forecasted, and, by
extension, earnings of those firms will be over-forecasted. In contrast, the cost stickiness
at the high end that is documented in this study suggests that costs will be over-forecasted
and thus earnings will be under-forecasted for firms facing a large increase in sales.
6.3 Limitations with future research directions
As this study mainly uses a survey instrument and interviews, it is subject to potential
caveats associated with behavioral studies, such as biased inputs from the survey/interview
respondents and/or samples not representative of the whole population. To mitigate this
concern, we also conduct an empirical analysis using archival data for publicly traded
companies in the U.S.
Another limitation in our study is that while we show that middle managers’ cost decisions
are sticky when the magnitude of sales increase is sufficiently large, whether the corporatelevel cost behavior is also sticky at the higher end remains untested. This suggests that
examining the corporate-level cost behavior at the high end will be an interesting venue
for future research.
Also, our survey and interview responses suggest that Porter’s (1979) five forces have
significant influence on cost and investment decisions, consistent with the common belief
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in the management literature. This suggests that it will be interesting and thus worth
exploring to examine how the five forces affect non-linearity in cost decisions individually
and collectively.
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